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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
GLADYS P. HENDRICKS,

Plaintiff,
-v.s.BRIGHA~I VICTOR HENDRICKS,

De f enda;nt.

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial
District of the State of Utah, in and for Cache County.
STATEMENT AS TO ISSUES
On February 28, 1952, plaintiff filed for divorce
alleging cruelty in general terms. On March 17, 1952,
defendant filed his answer and counter-claim denying
the allegation of cruelty on his pa.rt and by his counterclaim he sought a decree of divorce from plaintiff on
the grounds of cruelty.
The trial court, with commendable patience, heard
the evidence (which on plaintiff's part was offered
piecemeal and could conveniently be stated like an opera
as acts numbered one, two and three). After the closing
chapter the court refused to grant a divorce to either
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

party and on his own motion prepared findings of fact,
conclusions of law and a decree dismissing both the
complaint and counter-claim. In its findings number 2
the court expressly found that defendant was guilty of
cruel treatment to plaintiff. In finding number 4 the
court found that plainiff was also guilty of cruelty toward defendant. Whereupon the court applied the
doctrine of recrimination and denied each party any
relief.
It is self-evident that neither party was satisfied
with this decree, but inasmuch as plaintiff has seen fit
to appeal, it becomes respondent's duty to defend this
action because, in the language of the trial court, we do
not believe that the plaintiff can, by this appeal, become
"lily-white" while the defendant is branded as the
guilty party and charged with the responsibilities flowing
therefrom.
1. LAW. Before discussing the evidence it seems
proper to refer to a few general statements of law.
First: In divorce actions great latitude is. given the
trial court and unless there has been a clear abuse of
discretion an appellate court will not set aside the
judgment. As stated by the court of appeals of California in the case of Dup·es vs. Dupes 184 Pac. 425
''Whether acts and conduct constitute such
cruelty as warrants granting a divorce is a
question of such nature that the conclusion of
the tr-ial court is necessarily entitled to great
weight and it is only where it is without any
substantial support in the evidence that it will
he disturbed on appeal.''
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This court has time and again announced the same rule.
We do not belieYe that further citation of authority on
this question is necessary.
2. RECRIMI~y.._-lTION. __ The rule of recrimination
is stated that '' \"\rnere each of the spouses has been
guilty of misconduct "\Yhich is cause for divorce, neither
is entitled to a deeree.'' \\T e have not found a case
dealing "'ith the rule in this State and apparently appellant has not. Therefore unless ''"'e have overlooked such
a case it would seem that this court has never been
called upon to pass upon this question. However, the
rule seems to be established by the great weight of
American authority. Without attempt~ng to exhaust
the cases we cite the following from neighboring
states:
Blankenship vs. Blankenship 276 Pac. 9 (Annotated in 63 A. L. R. 1127)
Phillips vs. Phillip·s 236 P2d. 816
DeB11rgh vs. DeBurgh 240 P 2d. 625
Evans vs. Evans 157 P2d. 495
Brazell vs. Brazell 129 P2d. 117
Comfort vs. Comfort 112 P2d. 259
Mueller vs. ~I ueller 105 P2d. 1095
Heisler vs. Heiser 55 P2d. 727
Chevez vs. Chevez 50 P2d. 264 (Annotated 101 A.
L. R. 635)
Smith vs. Smith 31 P2d. 168

3. WAS THE APPLICATION OF THE RULE
/ AN ISSUE IN THIS CASE? Plaintiff asked for a
. divorce on the grounds of cruelty. Defendant in his
answer denied this allegation and by counter-claim
3
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charged plaintiff with cruelty. By a reply she denied
the same. The issues therefore before the court were
(a) Was defendant guilty of cruelty~ (h) Was plaintiff
guilty of cruelty~ (c) Was neither party guilty of
cruelty~ (d) Were both guilty of cruelty~ We cannot
see how the issue of recrimination could be more clearly
drawn by the pleadings. What more could be alleged
by way of recrimination~ We say, therefore, that the
rule was specifically raised by the pleading.
However, we believe that under better reasoning the
rule can he applied even though not specifically alleged
as an affirmative defense. The rule of recrimination
is based upon the equitable doctrine that ''he who comes
into equity must come· with clean hands." The application of this maxium bars relief to those guilty of
improper conduct in the matter as to which they seek
relief." (30 C. J. S. 475 Section 93)

''It is not strictly or primarily a matter of
defense, but is invoked on grounds of public
policy and for the protection of the integrity of
the courts.'' (See above citation)
We cite the following cases which support this theory:
Gynex Corporation vs. Dilex Institute 85 F2d 103
Teuscher vs. Gragg 276 Pac. 753
Eldridge vs. Eldridge 259 S. W. 209
Richman vs. Bank of Perris 282 Pac. 801
Smith vs. Ajax Pipe Line Company 87 F2d. 567
In all these cases. the maximum ''He who comes into
equity must come with clean hands'' was applied, when·
ever the evidence disclosed a situation calling for its
application.
4
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,,re have heretofore cited a number of cases spec-ifically dealing w·ith the rule of recrimination. In most
of these cases nothing is said about the rule· being an
affirmative defense "\Yhich must be specially pleaded.
Take for example the niuelle.r case. The issues were
formed just as they a.re in the case at bar, and the same
is true in at least most of the cases cited.
Furthermore since the adoption in this State of
the new rules, pleading·s have been greatly simplified.
Only certain enumerated affirmative defenses need be
pleaded. The list does not include the maxim ''He who
comes into equity must do equity'' as an affirmative
defense, which must he affirmatively pleaded (See Rule
8 Sub-division C).
As we view the situation the only question which
can be raised on this appeal is resolved simply to a
consideration of the question of whether or not there
is substantial evidence to support the court's finding
number 4 that plaintiff was he-rself guilty of cruelty
toward defendant. If this finding is sustained on
appeal, then the judgement must be sustained.
FACTS
While plaintiff has set forth in her brief a pur;..
ported stateme·nt of facts, we think a reading of the
entire record will disclose that plaintiff has, in many
respects, overstated or at least greatly colored the
facts. Her statement of the facts would lead one to
conclude that her testimony was the only testimony
offered in the ease. This, of course, was not true. Then
also it must be remembered that in a divorce action

5
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the trial court has an opportunity to see the witness,
consider her demeanor while on the witness stand and
thereby obtain a better impression of the situation than
can he obtained from reading the ''cold record.'' In
this case plaintiff attempted to prove her case in three
separate stages. On the first stage plaintiff testified
in full and rested. A reading of this testimony is quite
enlightening. She complained principally of money
matters and interference by a son of defendant. She
stated· that she had never lived on a farm before, that
the firs~t year on the farm at Lewiston they got along
p·retty well but tha:t the second year was not so good.
There was family interference, and that she purchased
part of the groceries ( Tr. 32) ; that she had an income
of $115.00 a month which was later raised to $125.00 per
month, which she spent for living expenses; that the
third year matters got worse. There was family trouble
with Vic's son and that on two or three occasions during
the second year and possibly more frequently during the
third year Vic would go away and remain overnight.
''Our trouble was mostly bickering over money."
(Tr. 35). .It is interesting to note that during her
recital of family troubles, not a word was said as to
defendant drinking to any exeess. Not a word was
said about his carrying on with other women. Not a
word wa1s said about so-called ''mash'' notes or anything of the kind. In her own language their troubles
were principally over money matters. She complained
that ,Vic didn't give her all the· money that she felt she
was entitled to receive, and she· claimed that she was
spending the rentals collected by her for family expenses.
On cross-examination she admitted that out of the
monthly income· was dedueted the taxes on her own
6
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property "'"hich amounted to approximately $25.00 per
month. She also admitted that she had borrowed
money from the bank and that $50.00 per month out of
the monthly income '"'as applied to the payment of
this loan (although she no"? claims that the loan has
never been repaid). She also admitted that Vic gave
her money but her sole complaint was that it was insufficient to maintain her standard of living. The
record showed that the plaintiff was the owner of
considerable property, that she kept and maintained her
own bank account, that she spent her own money as
she saw fit without in any way consulting with her
husband, that she operated her own automobile, that
she made loans to her son by a previous marriage, that
she purchased an automobile for him, that she was a
woman of rather extravagant tastes and apparently
quite improvident on the question of spending money.

After she had rested her case the defendant testified
· concerning the marital difficulties. He admitted that
he had had some financial reverses, that he was heavily
- indebted and that he was unable to give plaintiff all
the financial aid which she seemed to demand. However,
he furnished her a good home on a farm and contributed
regularly to her support. He produced checks going
back to the year 1945 (he was unable to find checks
antedating this date). His checks showed that during
::. the year 1945 he gave Mrs. Hendricks or paid out for
~ her use and benefit the sum of $576.75; in 1946 the, sum
s of $1059.67; in 1947 the sum of $1557.87; in 1948 the
• sum of $2336.82; in 1949 the sum of $1303.80; in 1950
~ the sum of $2787.07; and in 1951 the sum of $1672.04.
(See plaintiff's Exhibit No. AA). He further testified,
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and we think there can be no question as to this fact,
that in addition to the checks above referred to he paid
out in cash for groceries, household expenses, etc. additional sums which he could not specifically list but which
he estimates to be nearly as great as the total amount
of the checks, so that this was not a case where the
plaintiff was left without means. It was a case where
the plaintiff was discontented and disgruntled with
living on a farm and not being given all of the money
which she thought the defendant ought to supply her
with. The cold facts are that the plaintiff simply did
not like the quiet and somewhat secluded living on a
farm, and she became dissatisfied. Imagine her complaint that two or three times during a whole year the
defendant remained away from home overnight, no
suggestion of any improprieties committed by him at
any time.
The defendant then offered evidence in support of
his answer and counter-claim. He testified, and there
doesn't seem to be any particular dispute about it, that
immediately following the marriage they established
their home on the defendant's farm in Lewiston, that
the plaintiff brought her furniture with her from Logan,
that plaintiff /gave away most of defendants furniture
to members of the family, that they completely refurnished the home and apparently made it very comfortable and livable. He corroborated the fa.ct that
during the first year they got along very well, but
apparently during the second and third years there
was some discord, mostly money matters. Defendant
contends that he gave plaintiff money regularly to
support the family, which consisted only of the two of
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them except for a period "~hen plaintiff's son lived with
them, yet plaintiff appeared to be disgTuntled and dissatisfied. She didn't like living on a farm, she
apparently did not care to mix socially with the farmers
in Lewiston, she evidently had little to do and ·it is
quite apparent that she beg-an showing· evidences of
dissatisfaction.
Defendant testified that they had very little trouble
from the time of the marriage until 1946. He admitted
that during this period of time he was away from home
a few nights, during which time he was engaged in
business transactions (Tr. 107-108), but he states that
he did not think the plaintiff made any particular objection to that. During the summer of 1946 defendant's
son returned from the Army. He was married and
lived on adjoining property. Defendant had previously
been in the dairy business and had the facilities for
going back into the business, but lacked the capital to
do so. He and his son had some discussion as to again
restocking the farm with dairy cows and allowing the
son to operate the farm. The evidence further shows
· without conflict that the defendant was doing considerable trucking and as suggested he was he-avily in debt.
He concluded, therefore, to make a loan from the Bear
River State Bank in order to provide capital for
purchasing some dairy cattle and pay some of his
pressing obligations. However, when the subject was
discussed with the plaintiff she objected .and refused
to go along with the deal (Tr. 109), so defendant took
the plaintiff to the Bank at Tremonton for the purpose
of having her sign a note and mortgage. When she got
there and learned the object of the visit she absolutely
9
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and unequivocably refused to sign any note or mortgage
and so they returned to Lewiston without closing the
loan. No doubt a quarrel did ensue between them.
Defendant felt that plaintiff should have joined with
him in the consummation of the loan. She evidently
disagreed and so without further ado she packed all
of her belongings, ordered a van and left defendant's
home practically stripped of its contents. She returned
to Logan and refused to live any longer at Lewiston.
At that time· she advised defendant that she needed no
help from him and she could manage her own affairs
without his assistance.
There is some dispute as to the time before any
attempted reconciliation was effected. Defendant contends that he remained on the farm for better than a
year. The plaintiff contends it was about three months.
However, apparently the parties' attempted some kind
of a reconciliation. Plaintiff in the meantime had repurchased her home which she had previously sold to
her son-in-law and she had spent quite lavishly in remodeling, redecorating and refurnishing the same. From
that time until the filing of the complaint there seemed
to have been intermittent trouble between the parties.
Defendant wanted plaintiff to come back to the farm.
Plaintiff refused and insisted on living in Logan. This
did not create an. atmosphere of good will between the
parties. Defendant, being a farmer, had to leave early
in the morning and if he put in a full day on his farm
he could not return until late at night. This annoyed
the plaintiff, she being used to city life felt that they
should have an early dinner and she resented waiting
dinner until his return, with the result that defendant,
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if he did come home . would find it more convenient to
eat at a restaurant. But on the contrary to avoid frictions and turmoil he would remain for considerable
periods at the farm, cooking his own meals and getting
along as best he could.
During this period plaintiff decided to further improve her home and without any consultation with defendant she incurred a debt in excess of $2400.00. She
paid $1200.00 and demanded of defendant that he pay
the remainder, which he did. This was a considerable
time after he had borrowed the $1100.00 from her. He
contends that this payment was made to her in discharge
of the debt. She claims it was not. And so it wentbickering- and turmoil in which plaintiff apparently
contributed her share.
Finally, because defendant came home whistling
and in apparently a friendly mood, plaintiff called the
officers and made the direct charge that defendant was
addicted to the use of drugs and she wanted him arrested. She made this charge on one or two different
occasions. The defendant testified positively that he
had never touched drugs, and the court found this to he
true. After defendant had offered his evidence and
rested, then plaintiff came to the second act of the play.
She asked the court's permission to reopen her case
when court reconvened on April 28, 1952, (Tr. 143.)
Then for the first time she attempted to inject into
the case the question of gambling, something she had
entirely omitted in her case in chief. Her complaint
seemed to he that the defend~nt sometimes. played the
slot machines; however, it is quite apparent that the
11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

plaintiff enjoyed the same recreation except she contends that she played with smaller coins than the defendant. Appa:rently her greatest complaint arose from
the fact that on one occasion while they were at Malad
defendant won $50.00. Plaintiff asked him to split with
her his winnings, and he gave her only $5.00, stating
he was going to use the rest of it to buy a suit. (Tr.
154-155). They then went to Downey and they played
the slot machines, where he again won enough to pay
for their dinner. However his luck changed and he
lost the· $50.00 which he had won. The plaintiff's
chief complaint, therefore, seems to be that the defendant (foolish man) could not always win at the slot
machines.
She then for the first time injected into the ease
allege4 intoxication of the defendant. Apparently in
the first act of the drama she had neglected to mention
either the gambling or the alleged drinking and had
insisted that their principal trouble was merely over
money matlters. On cross-examin~tion plaintiff admitted that she also partook of intoxicating liquors on
occasions and that they had both drunk socially (Tr.
158). The case was again closed.
On Monday, June 9, 1952, further discussions were
had with the court and the case continued until July
7, 1952. After the court had indicated his views concerning the matter, plaintiff's counsel stated that plaintiff wanted to testify again, and so on the 28th day of
July, 1952, we entered Act 3 of the drama.
After the court had announced how he felt about
the matter and indicated an intention to find against
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both parties, the plaintiff moved the court to again
reopen the case and allo""' her to offer further evidence.
The court indicated some impatience with plaintiff
because of the piecemeal '"ay in 'Yhieh she had presented
her eYidence, but the court indicated that he would again
allow plaintiff to offer some additional testimony of
cruelty provided it 'Yas not cumulatiYe in character.
The plaintiff then for the first time testified that
she had g·one through the defendant's desk during the
summer of 1951 and had found some so-called ''mash''
letters, which were marked AA, BB and CO. The
plaintiff admitted that she had these exhibits in her
possession and knew of their existence prior to the date
of the trial. She offered no explanation as to why she
had not gone into this question and offered them as a
part of her case. It is true that after she had offered
these exhibits the court struck the testimony, hut we
fail to see 'Yherein the plaintiff was prejudiced in any
way .by reason of this ruling because the court notwithstanding his previous ruling included in his finding~
that "he exchanged 'mash' notes with women friends."
This evidence which the court ordered stricken was the
only evidence with respect to this matter and notwithstanding the court's order he considered the evidence
which was offered and made it a part of his finding.
Irrespective of this fact plaintiff is in no position to
complain because the court expressly found defendant
to be guilty of cruelty. The only question which can be
presented on this appeal is whether or not the court's
finding of fact number 4 is supported by the evidence.
We assert that the evidence hereinbefore referred to
abundantly establishes cruelty on the part of the plain-
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tiff. The defendant as the husband had the right to
designate where the plaintiff should reside so long
as he was providing a reasonably decent place for her
abode. He was dut.ybound to provide reasonably for
plaintiff's support, but he was under no legal obligation to do more than he was financially able to do. Certainly two people could and should have lived very
comfortably on a farm on the amount of money which
the defendant. gave to plaintiff by check and the additional amounts that he spent for groceries and other
household expenses from cash in his pocket. If the
plaintiff wanted to spend her own money she had that
right, but she certainly had no legal grounds to complain if defendant was doing all in his power to make
her reasonably comfortable. The court found that the
plaintiff deserted and abandoned the defendant's domicile and residence at Lewiston and moved to Logan without just cause and excuse. We think the evidence amply
supports this finding. The court also found that plaintiff had been a frequent user of intoxicating liquors.
This finding is amply supported by the evidence, as
plaintiff admits that she and her husband both drank
intoxicating liquors.
The court found that plain tiff wrongfully refused
to sign a mortgage to the Bear River State Bank, which
mortgage was asked for in good faith by defendant in
the furtherance of his business. This finding is amply
sustained by the evidence. All of that property belonged to the defendant before the marriag·e. Admittedly he was hard pressed for ready cash. He was attempting to better his financial position and put him-
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self in a position 'vhere he could eontribute more to
plaintiff~ but plaintiff stubbornly refused to sign the
papers, and then she precipitated a quarrel which led
to her abandoning the defendant.
The court further found that plaintiff wrongfully
accused defendant of being· a drug addict to certain
police officers of Logan, Utah, and attempted to have
the defendant incarc.era ted and jailed on that charge.
We think the evidence amply sustains this finding. She
sent for the offieers and told them her husband was
full of dope. If this charge were untrue, and defendant
testified it 'Yas and the court so found, we can think
of nothing which would cast a reflection on defendant's
character more than to make such accusation to third
parties. There was absolutely no justification for her
making such an ungrounded charge except to bring the
defendant into disrepute.
In addition to these facts we have heretofore suggested the court was best qualified to judge the parties
from their demeanor and behavior on the witness stand
and to draw reasonable inferences therefrom. 'Why
did the plaintiff elect to only tell part of the story then
the going seemed to be tough add to the story and again
a third time repeat the same procedure~ The court
had a right to conclude and infer that plaintiff was
not entirely honest and frank with the court. The court
had the right to infer from the whole proceedings that
much of the domestic difficulties was precipitated by
the plaintiff's own conduct, so we contend that finding
number 4 is amply sustained by the evidence, and that
this court upon a review after indulging the trial court
in a wide latitude of discretion should not disturb this
finding.

15
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This leaves only one other point to consider. Counsel for the plaintiff has spent a great deal of time in his
brief in discussing the finances of the parties. There
is no question but what both plaintiff and defendant
owned eonsiderable property at the time of this illadvised malf"riage. Plaintiff\'s property was practically clear and not encumbered. Defendant on the other
hand owed a good deal of money. From the start the
plaintiff kept her own money and her own property
entirely separate. She did not consult with defendant
relative to the same, but spent it as she ehose. The
plaintiff contends all of this money went for living
expenses and proposes therefore to charge it all against
the defenda<nt (See pages 9 and 10 of plaintiff's brief).
He also contends that because plaintiff reeeived $21,065.00 net cash in October, 1946, and that she paid
$6,000.00 for her home, $3,000.00 for remodeling,
$2,750.00 for a car and at the time of the trial she claimed
to have only $1,6.40.00 left which was represented by
two United States bonds; that she had therefore spent
$7,675.00 for household expenses notwithstanding the
fact that plaintiff admits that she drew a eheck for
$1,103.75 in 1947 for an automobile for her son and
another cheek for $1,200.00 was paid to Raymond, the
contractor, for additional alterations (See Tr. 162.)
If plaintiff was so improvident with her money she is
in no position to seek to reeover the same from the
defendant, who had absolutely no say as to how plaintiff spent her money or what she did with it. If, as
contended by plaintiff, she spent large sums of money
for household e-xpenses, then we ask where did the money
go which was admittedly paid to her by defendant~ How
16
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could her living expenses be so great unless· plaintiff
used her own money for extravagancies over which
defendant had no control. We wonder how much of this
money, if it was spent, went for needless things. How
much might have been used for the benefit of her children who were in no way dependent on plaintiff for support. Certainly plaintiff was in no position to show
that she ever gave defendant any money except one
check for $5.00 during the period they lived togethe·r.
Appellant also states that the defendant was the owner
of two trucks in which he had an equity of about
$4,000.00; however, his trucks are not paid for. Plaintiff also says that defendant is receiving a net rental
income of $5,400.00 a year. This, of course, is not true.
Plaintiff entirely overlooks that fact that defendant has
a $20,999.00 mortgage on his property which requires
periodic payments, and that the rent money has to be
· · used for that purpose a.s well as for the purpose of
paying taxes, interest on other indebtedness and incidental expenses. It is, however, defendant's contention that the judgment as entered by the court must
he sustained; and therefore all questions relating to
financial positions of the respective parties are of no
concern on this appeal.
We res-pectfully suggest that this c_ourt should
sustain the judgment.
Respectfully submitted,
LEROY B. YOUNG
and
HARVEY A. SJOSTROM
Attorneys for Defenda;nt
arnd Respo'YIJdent.
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